PG Lesson IV-Game Theory

This course is a rigorous investigation of the evolutionary and epistemic foundations of solution concepts, such as rationalizability and Nash equilibrium. It covers classical topics, such as repeated games, bargaining, and supermodular games as well as new topics such as global games, heterogeneous priors, psychological games, and games without expected utility maximization. Applications are provided when available.

Lecture Notes

• Review of basic concepts

• Application: Bargaining with complete information

• Extensive-form games with imperfect information

• Application: Signaling in bargaining

• Repeated games and their applications

SourceManea, Mihai, and Muhamet Yildiz. 14.126 Game Theory, Spring 2010. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology: MIT OpenCourseWare),http://ocw.mit.edu (Accessed 30 Jul, 2012). License: Creative Commons BY-NC-SA