Course Description
This course focuses on recent developments in contract theory. Topics include: advanced models of moral hazard, adverse selection, mechanism design and incomplete contracts with applications to theory of the firm, organizational design, and financial structure.
Lecture Notes
Games with Incomplete Information
Auctions and Mechanism Design
Auctions 1: Common auctions, revenue equivalence, and optimal mechanisms
Auctions 2: Independent private values (IPV) and revenue equivalence
Auctions 3: Interdependent values and linkage principle
Auctions 4: Multiunit auctions and Cremer-McLean mechanism
Source
Izmalkov, Sergei. 14.129 Advanced Contract Theory, Spring 2005. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology: MIT OpenCourseWare),http://ocw.mit.edu (Accessed 30 Jul, 2012). License: Creative Commons BY-NC-SA
